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In his The Buddhist Teaching of Totality (1974), C. C. Chang noted 
some of the interesting parallels between the process thought of Alfred 
North Whitehead and the Hua-yen Buddhist thought he was describing 
in his book. In my own Hua-yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra 
(1977), I also noted in passing some commonalities of vision in the two 
systems. Neither Chang nor I did more than briefly mention some 
parallels, but in the few years that have passed since then, a number of 
articles and one full-length study have appeared which try to compare 
the similarities in more detail and depth. These studies often originate 
in the belief that while both systems are impressive, each is somewhat 
imperfect, and that each can benefit from an encounter with the other. 
The result of “the current encounter of Buddhism with process 
philosophy,” says Robert Neville, “enables each to develop beyond its 
previous achievement.”1 2In the area of process theology, Charles Harts­
horne contemplates and welcomes a “Buddhisto-Christian religion” 
which combines the great insights of Buddhism and the Christian theology 
based on process thought of which he is the foremost living exponent?
1 Robert Neville, “Buddhism and Process Thought,” in Buddhism and American 
Thinkers, ed. Kenneth Inada and Nolan P. Jacobson (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1984), p. 122.
2 Charles Hartshorne, “Towards a Buddhisto-Christian Religion,” in the above 
publication, pp. 2-13.
This article is an attempt to contribute to this dialogue, by clarifying 
one or two points of controversy and suggesting satisfactory solutions. 
The focus of the discussion will be the recurrent criticism of Hua-yen 
by some process thinkers who reject no less than the central, characteristic 
Hua-yen teaching of the interdependence and interpenetration of con­
temporary entities. This theme appears frequently in the literature because 
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for Whitehead, who was extrapolating a metaphysics from the relativi­
ty physics as theorized in the 193O’s, it is impossible for any two or more 
contemporary entities (atoms in physics) to exert any causal influence 
on each other. So, if Whitehead is correct, the Hua-yen doctrine of shih 
shih wu ai (jiji muge) is in error. While there is often talk of a cross­
fertilization between Hua-yen and process thought, the discussion fre­
quently takes the form of a strong suggestion that Hua-yen abandon its 
central teaching and substitute a Whiteheadian scheme of a temporal 
causality wherein the past conditions (and creates) the present but in which 
any contemporaries are causally independent.3
3 The main source for Whitehead’s thought is the very difficult Process and Reality. 
A more accessible version can be found in Donald Sherbourne’s A Key to Whitehead’s 
Process and Reality (Indiana University Press, 1975). Another valuable interpretation 
is William Christian’s An Introduction to Whitehead’s Metaphysics (Yale University 
Press, 1959).
What has captured the attention of students of Whiteheadian thought 
and Hua-yen is a concurrence on several key points. First, there is the 
denial in both systems of an enduring substance or self as has been the 
object of criticism by Buddhism since its beginnings, but which has been 
at the foundation of Western philosophy and science for centuries. For 
Whitehead, as for Buddhism, no actual entity exists independently of 
other entities, nor does it endure self-identical through time. His 
philosophy is consequently a sharp departure from the traditional view 
of reality as composed of substances with attributes. A second area of 
agreement is a corollary of the first. “Existence” is, in Whitehead’s own 
terms, a “perpetual perishing,” in which all things that can be said to 
truly exist die into the past as soon as coming into being. Hence, his 
vision closely approximates the Buddhist view of being as impermanent 
becoming.
However, the most interesting parallel between the two systems is the 
idea that the entities that make up the world are mutually implicated 
or interdependent. Despite substantial and critical disagreements between 
the two visions of interdependence, it was the more general agreement 
that aroused Chang’s and my interest earlier in the decade. Both systems 
agree that an entity does not exist independent of other—perhaps all— 
entities, and therefore, any entity must be understood as being essen­
tially relational by nature and constitution. First Buddhism, and then 
Whitehead many centuries later, discovered the essentially social, rela­
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tional nature of things. However, despite this fundamental agreement, 
the two systems disagree on the basic structure of this relationality. Hua- 
yen is mainly concerned with demonstrating how simultaneously existing 
entities, or contemporaries, exert a conditioning influence on each other 
in mutual reciprocity, how they depend on each other in an ecology of 
cosmic dimensions, and how they include each other, or co-inhere. It 
is in this sense that things do not exist independently but rather in­
terdependent ly. But, by “dependent existence” Whitehead means that 
a present entity is dependent on, and arises from, past entities, not con­
temporaries. The interdependence is a rather weak one, in that two con­
temporaries share a by-and-large common past and are related internal­
ly through appropriating each other’s past experience. However, in 
accordance with Einstein’s relativity theory, the two or more contem­
poraries are causally independent, cannot co-inhere, or internally con­
stitute each other. Consequently, from the point of view of process 
thought, Hua-yen is mistaken in believing that contemporaries causally 
influence each other. From the point of view of Hua-yen, process thought 
is deficient in allowing for only a temporal cause-effect relationship and 
not allowing contemporaries to condition each other.
The “entities” I have been referring to in connection with Whitehead 
are the core of his metaphysics, and the important category of “causa­
tion” refers to the relationship among these entities. Whitehead calls them 
“actual entities” or “actual occasions,” and claims that they are the 
really real things of which the world is composed. They are not the 
perceived objects of ordinary experience, such as people, plants, stones, 
houses, etc., which are composites or “societies” of these actual occa­
sions. An actual occasion is not material or even a thing, but is, as 
Whitehead calls it, a drop of experience. An actual occasion is a quan­
tum of feeling, a happening, a way of taking data into account, and 
everything, whether granite boulder or human being, is composed fun­
damentally of these quanta of experience. Actual occasion succeeds ac­
tual occasion in a serial route, so that a macrocosmic enduring object 
is analyzable into a vast number of these routes of occasions.
The actual occasion is for the most part a product of the past, in the 
sense that it is a convergence or concrescence of past experiences which, 
as Buddhism would affirm, possess causal efficacy. The actual occasion 
comes into being through a series of “phases of concrescence” during 
which these past occasions regroup themselves into a new unity, the novel 
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actual occasion. As the past assumes a new unity, it achieves a deter­
minate form, at which time it perishes to become a datum in the past, 
to be a potential component in a later synthesis. However, when 1 say 
that the actual occasion is “for the most part” a product of the past, 
I mean that it is not wholly explainable as a new unity of past experiences. 
Whitehead says that the concrescing conditions from the past are able 
to decide what new form they will assume, so that the new entity is part­
ly self-causal or self-determining as well as being a result of past condi­
tions. It is important to note that this self-determination is not the act 
of a preexistent subject or self which surveys the past and decides how 
to use it. The subject which decides arises out of the objective data 
themselves, and it is this constantly emerging and perishing series of sub­
jects which are said to decide what new shape they will assume. As soon 
as the new form emerges, the entity perishes, so that reality is a succes­
sion of actual occasions becoming and perishing: “the many become one 
and are increased by one.” The real word is thus a fluid transition from 
actual occasion to actual occasion, lacking any enduring substratum, 
which is why this is called “process philosophy.”
What is to be noticed in this description is that the causal flow is from 
past to present only; that is, past experiences possessing causal power 
converge and assume a novel unity. Consequently, to say that real 
things—actual occasion—are dependent on the world of other actual en­
tities means that they are dependent on past entities. Two or more con­
temporaries in parallel routes can not condition each other. They may 
have various external relationships but can have no internal relationships 
in the sense of constituting each other in the way past occasions inter­
nally constitute an emerging occasion. The upshot of this discussion is 
that causal or conditioning power flows from past to present. It does 
not flow from present to past or from the future to present or past, nor 
does it operate among contemporaries, as Hua-yen claims.
There is much more to Whitehead’s philosophy than the idea of “ac­
tual occasions” and temporal causation, such as the doctrines of “eter­
nal objects” and the dipolar God, but this brief description will suffice 
for the following discussion. Nor will I attempt to outline the formal 
arguments given by Hua-yen thinkers for its teaching of interdependence, 
interpenetration, and so on, on the assumption that readers of this journal 
will be familiar with them. It is only necessary to mention by way of 
contrast with the Whiteheadian view that Hua-yen is famous for a doc­
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trine of multi-directional causality. The future conditions the present and 
past, the present conditions past and future, and the past conditions pre­
sent and future. Most importantly, contemporaries condition each other 
in this Chinese application of the doctrine of sunyata.
This latter doctrine is made abundantly clear and unambiguous by not 
only the formal arguments of a text such as Fa-tsang’s Wu chiao chang 
(Go kyd sho) but particularly by the images used to illustrate this rela­
tionship. The images of the ten coins, the building and a rafter in it, 
and the jewel net of Indra are images of simultaneously existing par­
ticulars or parts that make up a totality (i.e., the dharma-dhatu). 
Someone like Fa-tsang is not particularly interested in the history or 
material origin of the rafter in the building (though, as 1 will argue, this 
is adequately accounted for), but rather is interested in the relationship 
among particulars or individuals which exist as facts of experience and 
which constitute a whole. Nor is someone such as Fa-tsang interested 
in the microcosmic components of enduring objects as Whitehead is. Fa- 
tsang wants to understand how animals, plants, and so on, are related. 
The central Hua-yen question (and perhaps Buddhist question) is, given 
that I find myself, in everyday experience, one among many others, what 
am I, what are they, and how are we related?
Several problems need to be addressed before proceeding to the main 
point of my discussion. The first is the problem of multi-directional 
causality in Hua-yen thought. Process philosophy is unanimous in re­
jecting it because it appears to threaten the freedom of decision or self- 
determination (free will) which is said to be a crucial and real part of 
the career of the actual occasion over and above its conditionedness. A 
typical reaction to the Hua-yen version of causality can be seen in a recent­
ly published comparative study of Hua-yen and Whitehead, Steve Odin’s 
Process Metaphysics and Hua-yen Buddhism (State University of New 
York Press, 1982). Quoting Charles Hartshorne, Odin claims that the 
Hua-yen doctrine of multi-directional causality precludes the possibili­
ty of creativity, freedom, and novelty, since each entity is reducible simply 
to its many causes or conditions (pp. 75-78). The point seems to be 
that if the future is determinate and can act as a cause for the present, 
then there is no possibility of freely choosing a different future. This 
also means that there is no freedom of decision because the present ac­
tuality is nothing more than the effect of massive conditions. What is 
at stake is self-determination or freedom, an act strenuously defended 
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and affirmed by all process thinkers. It may be the one non-n egot i able 
item in the whole Whiteheadian scheme, less expendable even than the 
Whiteheadian God.
I would like to try to defuse this issue by suggesting that the Hua-yen 
idea of future events exerting causal influence on the present is not an 
essential part of its total system and may be eliminated. Here I follow 
the suggestion of Yusugi Rydei, who has made the point in his Kegon 
Taikei that Hua-yen thinkers included the idea in the system in order 
to account for problems that arose in interpreting material from the 
Avatarpsaka Sutra.4 In that text, spoken by the Buddha immediately after 
his enlightenment, while he is revealing the content of the sagara-mudra 
samadhi (kai-in zammai), Anathapiodika’s gift of the garden six years 
after the enlightenment is spoken of as a present occurrence (i.e., pre­
sent at the time the sutra is being delivered), and so is the Buddha’s 
mother’s death, which had occurred many years in thepatf. Both events, 
future and past, are experienced as present events. In the absence of a 
critical and historical understanding of the composition of this scripture, 
Fa-tsang had to develop some explanation for what appeared to be a 
discrepancy of time. The result was a doctrine of the interpenetration 
of time and its corollary, the multi-directional flow of time and causality.
4 Yusugi Rydei, Kegon TozArez (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankdkai, repr. 1975), pp. 500-502.
Fa-tsang knew, as did all his predecessors, that time as we know it 
is an abstraction from real time as the flow of concrete nature. This is 
also Whitehead’s position. For him, the quantum of real time is iden­
tical with a quantum of experience (the duration of an actual occasion). 
Both Fa-tsang and Whitehead thus agree that, in Fa-tsang’s words, “time 
is inseparable from dharmas.” Now, “present” must refer to events tak­
ing place now, and “past” must refer to events that have occurred, are 
dead, and which can, as causes, be reenacted in the present. However, 
“future” must refer to events that have not yet occurred, and it is dif­
ficult to see how something which has not occurred, a mere possibility 
or potential, can have a causal effect on the present. This seems implausi­
ble on the level of concrete experience, though it might make sense if 
time were thought of abstractly and visualized spatially as it seems to 
be in the sagara-mudra samadhi. But such a view of time is problematical 
for Hua-yen if it is referring to real time. It is significant that neither 
of Fa-tsang’s successors, Hui-yiian, and Tsung-mi, had much interest 
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in the idea and may have seen it as either unimportant or suspect. Perhaps 
we should consider the idea to be simply a response to a hermeneutical 
problem and not essential to the philosophy. Thus, it may not really be 
an issue at all, although the idea of self-determination or freedom is not 
necessarily rescued with the rejection of the idea of the causal efficacy 
of the future.
A second problem concerns oversimplification or incompleteness in 
describing the whole Hua-yen system. Odin, in his above-mentioned book, 
is typical of a tendency among process critics of Hua-yen to see only 
a part of the whole Hua-yen picture. They focus attention on the doc­
trine of identity but fail to take into account the whole story, which is 
identity in difference. Or, they focus attention of totality but fail to see 
that Hua-yen is talking about the relationship of the whole to real parts. 
Also, Hua-yen is talking not just of emptiness but an emptiness in­
separable from things or events (shih, Ji). Most important, however, critics 
such as Odin are so exclusively concerned with the interpenetration or 
intercausality of contemporaries that they ignore or do not appreciate 
sufficiently the important, traditional doctrine of temporal causality. It 
must be remembered that Fa-tsang’s primary objective was to incorporate 
all Buddhist teachings into one grand synthesis. In doing so, he took 
account of the temporal cause-effect relationships taught by the earlier 
schools.
Odin believes that the doctrine of the interdependence of contem­
poraries is a doctrine of genesis which tries to explain the material origins 
of things (p. 65). But he neglects the presence in Hua-yen of a genetic 
model of origins very similar to that of process thought. Hua-yen would 
explain the origin of a human being, for instance, as the result of the 
union of parental sperm and egg (which of course also has its own 
antecedents). The fertilized egg results later in the birth of a human be­
ing in a temporal cause and effect process. However, once the human 
being appears in the world, he finds himself in a world of many other 
beings—human, nonhuman, sentient, and nonsentient—and then the 
question is, what is his relationship with all these other beings? Fa-tsang 
recognizes both kinds causality or conditionedness, the temporal and the 
simultaneous. When he discusses the relationship of the rafter to the whole 
house, for instance, he is not concerned with where the wooden rafter 
came from but rather its relationship to the whole house. However, he 
would account for the material origin of the piece of wood in terms of 
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antecedent causes and conditions.5
5 See my translation of an extended portion of Fa-tsang’s Hua-yen i-ch'eng chiao 
i fen-ch ’i chang (Go kyO shO), in my Hua-yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra (Penn­
sylvania State University Press, 1977, pp. 75-89), where the analogy of the building and 
a rafter is discussed. Although Fa-tsang is concerned with the relationship of part and 
whole, it is clear from his description of the rafter in terms of size, shape, etc., that 
he accounts for the particular in temporal as well as atemporal terms.
6 Kenneth Inada, “The Metaphysics of Cumulative Penetration Revisited,” Process 
Studies, vol. 13, no. 2, 1983. pp. 154-158.
7 Steve Odin. “A Metaphysics of Cumulative Penetration,” Process Studies, vol. 11, 
no. 2. 1981, pp. 65-82.
8 A substantial criticism of the notion of self-causation or freedom on the level of 
Whitehead’s “actual occasion” can be found in Steven David Ross’ Perspective in 
Whitehead’s Metaphysics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983, pp. 
61-83). His basic argument is that Whitehead has ill-advisedly used the model of 
human consciousness and perception to develop a theory of self-causation on a non- 
Relationships in Hua-yen are thus a more complex matter than in pro­
cess thought. In the latter, relationships are discussed primarily in terms 
of temporal causation, cumulative genetic inheritance, and emergent novel 
entities. To use Odin’s terminology, process thought sees important causa­
tion in terms of cumulative penetration, in which the increasing richness 
of historical experience (both personal and nonpersonal) is synthesized 
perpetually into emergent novel unities. Hua-yen, and Buddhism general­
ly, shares a very similar conception, but then goes on to analyze the rela­
tionships among emergent contemporaries, discussing them in terms of 
interpenetration, mutual support, and ecological interdependence. It con­
sequently supplements a conception of emerging reality with one of merg­
ing reality, a point well made by Kenneth Inada6 in his response to an 
earlier article by Odin in which Odin recapitulates his criticisms in his 
book.7 Inada makes the further point, with which I agree, that Odin has 
overlooked the presence of temporal causation in Hua-yen and that the 
presence of such a conception provides for all the freedom, creativity, 
and novelty required. I believe that Inada is generally correct as far as 
creativity and novelty are concerned, but he may be too eager to find 
the ground for freedom in the Buddhist temporal causality. In other 
words, I am not so sure that freedom or self-determination are proven 
facts, for I doubt that Buddhism accepts the notion, and I doubt that 
Whitehead and Hartshorne are correct in saying that freedom is a fact. 
I will return to this important issue in a moment.8
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Now I must return to what I hope may help to clarify the major 
disagreement between the two philosophies, the Hua-yen doctrine of the 
interdependence and interpenetration of contemporaries. Most of the 
debate has been on the side of process thought and little clarification 
of Hua-yen thought has come from a Buddhist perspective. Odin has 
granted that Hua-yen’s position is plausible as long as interdependence 
and interpenetration pertain to words, names, and concepts, but not if 
they refer to concrete reality (p. 25). His theory seems to be based on 
C. C. Chang’s interpretations, in The Buddhist Teaching of Totality, 
which in turn rely on an idealistic (w>ei-shih, yuishiki) view of Hua-yen. 
I tend to believe that Hua-yen is a genuine cosmology and a description 
of concrete reality, not a theory about abstract, mental events. In this 
I agree with scholars such as Yusugi and Takamine who see Hua-yen 
as a species of the teaching of tathagata-garbha. Inada has argued that 
while the dynamic, temporal process described by Whitehead and Hua- 
yen is an accurate description on one level, the teaching of the interdepn- 
dence of contemporaries is a vision of the dharma-dhatu (the “realm 
of reality”) from a higher standpoint, from the perspective of enlighten­
ment. The implication is that what may be true on one level is not 
necessarily true on the other.
There is little point in trying to prove that one system of thought is 
superior to the other, for several reasons. First, both systems are self- 
admittedly incomplete and provisional. Whitehead denounced absolutism 
and foresaw that his metaphysics would be modified in time, and con­
temporary process thinkers are fond of saying that “process thought is 
still in process.” Hua-yen thinkers in turn saw their philosophy as a mere 
attempt to articulate, demonstrate, and systematize an intuition derived 
from samadhi experience. Second, despite so much agreement between 
the two, one is speculative metaphysics in the Western tradition and the 
other is a religious view with salvific objectives. Third, and this is my 
main point, Whitehead’s subject for analysis is the actual entity, short­
lived in that its life-span is probably to be measured in microseconds, 
and microcosmic in that the macrocosmic “enduring objects” of daily 
experience are composed of vast numbers of strands or routes of these 
serially ordered entities. Hua-yen, on the other hand, is primarily in­
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terested in analyzing the relationship among these “enduring objects’’ 
of ordinary experience. My question is this: is what is true on the 
microcosmic level necessarily true on the macrocosmic level?
If we admit the validity of speculation, there is no reason for not ac­
cepting the structure of experience on the microcosmic level so carefully 
articulated by process thought. This structure is not all all inconsonant 
with the more generalized conception first set forth in Buddhist abhidhar- 
ma texts and subscribed to by subsequent Buddhist schools as well. In 
fact, there is no compelling reason why Buddhist thought can not be 
enriched by appropriating the Whiteheadian analysis of causality on the 
microcosmic level. A demythologized, existential interpretation of kar­
ma, for instance, could find a systematic grounding in such process 
categories as “prehension,” “actual occasion,” “objective immortali­
ty,” and others. On the macrocosmic level of human experience, it might 
also provide a framework for understanding and discussing what some 
schools of Buddhism call the “true self.” However, such a tantalizing 
idea can be no more than hinted at here.9
9 Jay McDaniel has developed an interesting interpretation of the Buddhist “true self” 
using Whiteheadian language and models in “Zen and the Self,” in Process Studies, 
vol. 10, no. 3-4, 1980, pp. 73 ff. I have written a similar interpretation based on some 
lines from DOgen’s essay, GenjO-kOan. It will appear in 1984 in The Presence of DOgen, 
ed. William LaFleur, and published by University of Hawaii Press.
For Buddhism to incorporate the Whiteheadian description of causality 
on the level of occasions of experience would merely entail accepting 
a more detailed analysis of a doctrine already part of Buddhist think­
ing. Such an acceptance would also involve an admission that on this 
level of reality the flow of causal power is unidirectional only, from past 
to present. But should this description of causality be applied to the 
macrocosmic level of everyday experience? Many scientists believe that 
the laws that are observable on the subatomic level of particles do not 
necessarily apply to larger things. The discovery in physics that the 
behavior of particles is not predictable led many who sought a proof 
of freedom (as opposed to determinism) to claim that this proved that 
on the most fundamental level of reality the strict determinism that makes 
predictability possible does not exist either. Their conclusion was that 
this proved in turn that on the level of human consciousness, strict deter­
minism does not operate. However, it was soon realized that the con- 
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elusion was based on the suspicious premise that what is true on one 
level is true on the other. In fact, however, it is widely felt that while 
randomness may be the rule on the level of particles, larger bodies still 
obey Newtonian laws. The issue for Hua-yen is not that of freedom or 
predictability, however, but the issue of whether causal laws that operate 
on the microcosmic level also operate on the macrocosmic level.
To deny interdependence and interpenetration on the level of macro- 
cosmic reality seems to deny the solidarity or unity of nature and any 
possibility of a genuine community. This is what Whitehead has done 
in saying that contemporary actual occasions are a mere chaos, at best 
only indirectly related and possessing only the weakest mutual immanence 
in inheriting a more-or-less common past and acting as potentials for 
all future becomings. Odin perceives the crucial importance of this idea 
in Whitehead’s system: contemporaries are mutually immanent (and in­
terdependent) “in only the weakest and most indirect sense of the word. 
Yet, what is lost in cosmological solidarity through the mutual exclu­
sion of contemporaries is gained in creative freedom” (p. 94). Thus any 
family togetherness of contemporaries is impossible, but the gain is the 
ability of the emerging occasion to freely decide—outside the massive 
conditions that constitute it—how it will synthesize the objective data 
and assume a novel unity.10
10 Whitehead simply seems to assume that the existence of novel unities implies that 
self-causation is a reality. That is, he equates self-causation with unity. One of the main 
objections to the Hua-yen view of complete causality is that if the individual is simply 
the locus of innumerable conditions which are constantly changing, the individual never 
is able to unify the innumerable experiences so as to be a determinate being. In fact, 
one can not really be a unique individual, because uniqueness is identified with self- 
determined unity. However, Ross explains uniqueness on other grounds, and I have 
discussed this in the article.
But notice what this implies if applied to the macrocosmic level. It 
means that although I, as one being, am conditioned by your past (as 
well as the past of all others, of course) and may be a condition for your 
future, as two simultaneously existing beings we have no essential, real 
relationship. But we do in fact recognize and even affirm the importance 
of interdependence on the level of ecological systems and human societies. 
When we sit down to dinner, for instance, we can contemplate all the 
conditions that brought this food to this table at this time, conditions 
meaning many other people, soil, rain, and so on. In fact, there is a very 
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intricate web of interrelating conditions working to bring the food to 
the table. We do not extend gratitude and thanksgiving to past events, 
we acknowledge the contemporary world as being the matrix in which 
this event occurs. Regardless of the relationship among actual entities 
in a temporal sequence, the larger beings composed of these entities and 
inhabiting a common world seem to be interdependent in some very im­
portant way. It is difficult to appreciate why the microcosmic part is 
more real or primary than the whole of which it becomes a constituent, 
but process thinkers do assign ontological primacy to the actual occa­
sion and consequently to the type of temporal causation that presumably 
operates on this level.
The details of the Hua-yen doctrine of interdependence and in­
terpenetration occupy major portions of Hua-yen treatises, and it is not 
possible to review them here. However, a truncated and generalized state­
ment is possible and necessary in order that I can subsequently make 
an important point. At the core of Hua-yen thought lies, I believe, a 
fascination—a very Chinese fascination at that—with the particular or 
individual. This fascination is revealed historically in several ways, in 
the Hua-yen philosophy itself, in the “one-comer” paintings of the Sung 
period, in a painting such as Mu-chi’s pa-pa bird, and in Japan in Do- 
gen’s demand that we “thoroughly penetrate” (gujin) the ordinary events 
of daily life in order to grasp their true nature (jisso). As Takahashi 
Masanobu has suggested, this “thorough penetration” has a distinctly 
esthetic character and is related to the concept of yugen.11 Both gujin 
and yugen concern the possibility of apprehending a hidden dimension 
of things, gujin being the epistemological side and yugen being the on­
tological side of the search.
11 Takahashi Masanobu, The Essence of DOgen (London: Kegan Paul International, 
1983). See chapter 5, “Gfljin (thoroughness) and Buddha,” and chapter 6, part 1, **GQ- 
jin and yQgen (profundity).”
I am suggesting that behind the seemingly abstract analysis of parts 
and whole and behind the interminable categories and subcategories of 
Hua-yen thought lurks this concern for the hidden dimension of an event, 
the question, “What is it really?” Drawing on the terminology of part 
and whole, particular and universal, same and different, empty and ex­
istent, and having power and lacking power, Hua-yen thinkers attempt 
to draw some basic conclusions. The first is a simple one but with broad 
23
COOK
implications: the whole is necessarily made up of parts, and the part is 
always part of a whole. The important question arising from this point 
is, what is a whole that has no parts, or, more importantly, what is a 
part (individual) that has no context or nexus? To Hua-yen thinkers, 
a part isolated from its context is irrational and meaningless, and the 
only way to understand what something is is to take account of its whole 
world. Whitehead makes the same point very strongly, but he means that 
the individual, which is the actual entity, cannot be isolated from its past 
world because it is in fact mostly a synthesis of that past world. Hua- 
yen is asking a different question and on a different level of experience. 
Contemplating the world of beings both human and otherwise, it asks 
whether we are isolated monads as individuals with no intimate relation­
ships or rather whether what we are is a function of our togetherness. 
Hua-yen sees the individual as an ultimately indispensable contributor 
to the whole, a unique individual with its own intrinsic, incomparable 
value. However, at the same time, the individual is a product of the whole 
and in fact derives its uniqueness and supreme value from the whole which 
conditions it. The result is that a unique being (unique in form and func­
tion) plays its role in the life of the whole society of beings, and the society­
whole provides the necessary supportive conditions for the individual. 
In effect, however, the individual is the specific individual which con­
tributes its own powers by borrowing (or “usurping,” to use a Hua-yen 
term) the supportive power of the whole society. This is what “in­
terpenetration” means. It is also why emptiness is identical with form. 
Most important, however, the perception of this intimate interdependence 
among a family of beings serves as the basis for both the esthetic valua­
tion of the individual and for ethical conduct.12 Thus, Hua-yen, like 
Whitehead, argues for the fundamentally social nature of reality, but 
in different ways. I would like to suggest that in “thoroughly penetrating” 
some thing or event as Ddgen teaches, what is grasped is this dimension 
of the individual entity.
12 See the last chapter, “Living in the Net of Indra,” of my Hua-yen Buddhism: The 
Jewel Net of Indra, which concerns the ethical implications of Hua-yen.
The kind of dependency addressed by Hua-yen is obviously different 
from the kind analyzed by Whitehead. The point I wish to make may 
be put in the form of a question: is the Hua-yen version of relatedness 
less fundamental, primary, or significant than the process version? In 
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Whiteheadian terms, is this kind of external relatedness less real or im­
portant than the internal relatedness of process thought? Process thinkers 
say that it is. Because, as Whitehead says, actual entities are the really 
real things of which the world is composed, because actual entities are 
only internally related (the present is a synthesis of the past), and because 
contemporary occasions are only externally related in a weak and in­
direct manner, actual entities and their internal relations have ontological 
primacy and significance. By implication, the same must be true of 
macrocosmic reality, though in fairness it must be said that process 
thought does not usually draw this implication. My suggestion has been 
that while process thought may be correct as far as microcosmic reality 
is concerned, it is not necessarily correct in assuming, if it does, that 
the same patterns occur on the macrocosmic order.
There are three basic objections to assigning priority to actual occa­
sions and internal relatedness. First, it has been said that Whitehead is 
merely arbitrary to assign primacy to actual entities and internal 
relatedness and to deny it to macrocosmic actuality and external 
relatedness.15 The issue is one of ultimacy, and the question is whether 
ultimacy can be postulated outside of a particular perspective. Unless 
some comprehensive viewpoint can be established, some ultimate tribunal, 
it seems arbitrary to claim finality or absoluteness for some pattern or 
datum of experience. Second, temporal process is not the only kind of 
relationship among things and is not necessarily primary or even fun­
damental. It is primary if the main concern is the question of the origin 
and destiny of microcosmic drops of experience, with the assumption 
that the latter are really real, concrete, etc. However, as in the first ob­
jection, this may be true only from a certain perspective; from another 
perspective, the non-processive relationships among larger realities, such 
as that between parents and children, might be primary, fundamental, 
and significant. Thus, there are many kinds of relationship, each valid 
and important from a certain perspective, but perhaps no one absolute 
and ultimate relationship. This objection seems to be in accordance with 
Buddhist ways of looking at things. However, the point has been made 13
13 Justus Buehler makes the point in one way or another in his writings. See, for in­
stance, “On a Strain of Arbitrariness in Whitehead’s System,’* Journal of Philosophy, 
vol. 66, no. 19 (Oct. 1969), p. 590. See also, Metaphysics of Natural Complexes (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1966).
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by Justus Buehler in his philosophy of “ontological parity,” or “ordinal 
metaphysics,” where he has accused Whitehead’s position of having a 
“strain of arbitrariness.”14 The third objection has already been made 
earlier in this article: patterns and structures that may occur on the 
microcosmic level may not necessarily be relevant to larger entities.
14 See the previous note.
The main resistance to the possibility of interdependence and in­
terpenetration among contemporaries is that these relationships render 
freedom (self-determination), novelty, and creativity impossible. Freedom 
is the basis for the novelty and creativity which is the essence of process 
thought, and Whitehead believes that novelty and creativity are not possi­
ble without freedom. Odin, for instance, sees Hua-yen as involving “a 
doctrine of total determinism since each dharma can be exhaustively fac­
tored or reductively analyzed into its constituent causes and supportive 
conditions without remainder” (p. 4). Following Hartshorne’s lead, he 
concurs that the Hua-yen causality precludes the possibility of creativi­
ty, freedom, and novelty, since each thing is nothing more than the result 
of manifold causes (pp. 77-78). Whitehead’s causation permits such a 
possibility, because, while the past entities which serve as objective data 
for the emerging actual occasion limit the possible ways for the occa­
sion to take a novel form, the emerging occasion still is able to choose 
what form it will become. Thus, while causation plays a heavy role in 
the life of the actual occasion, there is freedom of decision which per­
mits uniqueness and novelty, as opposed to mere repetition of form. Since 
the Hua-yen view, on the other hand, is said to preclude freedom, by 
implication it must also preclude novelty and uniqueness.
I think that there are several ways of responding to this criticism. First, 
it may be asked whether the freedom of decision by an actual entity is 
a fact rather than an assumption. Steven David Ross, in a book-length 
criticism of Whitehead’s philosophy, has made a point sometimes made 
by others: “The concept of self-causation in Whitehead’s theory is pro­
blematical ...” (p. 61). It is problematical because we must somehow 
believe that the freedom to decide anything can occur on the unconscious 
level of microcosmic drops of experience. It must always be remembered 
that the actual occasion is an emergent synthesis of past data from past 
experiences, and during the time that the many data achieve a unified 
form, these data themselves decide their own final unified form. There
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is no preexistent subject that synthesizes and decides; the subject which 
decides emerges during and from the synthesis. Ross believes that this 
idea is the result of extrapolating from human consciousness and ex­
perience, where Whitehead ascribes to actual occasions what may only 
be possible on the level of high grades of consciousness. Whitehead seems 
to believe that the emergence of new unities from a multiplicity indicates 
an element of self-determination among the multiplicity itself, but the 
question is whether the existence of unities necessarily proves self- 
determination.
A second response is that if this kind of freedom is indeed a fact and 
is inherent in temporal causation, then Hua-yen is able to account for 
freedom inasmuch as it incorporates temporal causation into its system 
as well as an atemporal causation among contemporaries. This point has 
been made by Kenneth Inada in his reply to Odin.15 There is no reason 
why a comprehensive metaphysics could not assert an asymmetrical causa­
tion on the microcosmic level to account for freedom, and a symmetrical 
causation on the macrocosmic level to found mutual support, mutual 
support, mutual implication, and real social solidarity.
A third response might follow some modem philosophers and say that 
the issue of freedom versus determinism is a pseudo-problem. This posi­
tion assumes a complete determinism. It means that conditions are 
reasons, and there are always reasons for an event. For an event to oc­
cur without a reason or condition would mean that it just happened by 
chance, a purely random occurrence. Thus, the opposite of reasons or 
conditions is not freedom but rather randomness. However, neither Bud­
dhism nor secular thought recognizes randomness. In the area of moral 
responsibility and choice, for instance, it is obvious that many condi­
tions have brought about a situation in which a choice must be made. 
It is less obvious that the resulting choice is conditioned also, but is it 
possible to think of a choice that was not the outcome of a massive 
amount of conditioning? It would seem that a really free choice could 
only be made by flipping a coin or throwing the dice.
An alternate possibility is to see the choice itself as simply another 
condition rather than as an act outside of conditions. In conformity with 
the first suggestion, this one sees any event as the outcome of condi­
tions, in which the final decision preceding the act or event is seen as
IS See note 6.
27
COOK
one among many conditions, rather than a unique event lacking the 
character of a condition albeit itself conditioned.
Then what does “freedom” or “self-determination*’ mean? The answer 
given by some philosophers is that “freedom” means a conscious sense 
of lack of coercion. In other words, to feel that no one or no thing 
forced one to act in a certain way is to feel free, despite the presence 
of many conditions discoverable in objective analysis. As an example, 
let us take two men who find themselves in the army. One has been drafted 
and the other has voluntarily enlisted. Both, however, are in the iden­
tical situation in being in uniform. Yet, they feel very different, because 
one feels victimized by forces beyond his control, while the other feels 
free because he decided to be where he is. However, the truth seems to 
be that both men were caused, or conditioned, to be where they are, by 
conditions including the political condition of their country, military 
needs, their ages and nationality, parental upbringing and advice, feel­
ings of patriotism, and so on. Consequently, many conditions converge 
to bring about a definite result for both men, but despite determining 
factors, one feels free, the other does not. Perhaps to feel free is to be 
free, despite the obvious heavy weight of conditions that lie behind any 
decision or situation.
The self-determination of actual occasions is indeed problematical in 
Whitehead’s philosophy, and it may be equally problematical on the level 
of human consciousness. Whitehead believed it was necessary in order 
to ground uniqueness and novelty of becoming. If an actual occasion 
is not free to decide its final, determinate form, it will simply repeat its 
past, rendering impossible both uniqueness and new unities that in turn 
enrich the future. However, Steven David Ross has suggested that self­
causation is not necessary for uniqueness and novelty, and that these 
can be accounted for by the fact that each entity or being is a particular 
perspective on the whole world and is in turn in perspective by that world 
(pp. 19-20). The sheer multiplicity of perspectives should guarantee 
that each vantage point is unique, and the constantly changing perspec­
tives should guarantee novel unities, without having to postulate free, 
self-determining subjects. I think that this position is quite similar to 
the Hua-yen view described earlier. Uniqueness is the result of the myriad 
conditions, not despite them, and novelty, or new unities, is the result 
of the constant shifting configuration of conditions in dynamic interac­
tion. This implies, of course, the selflessness or substancelessness of things
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(sunyata) but at the same time guarantees uniqueness and novelty. This 
solution allows the uniqueness and novelty so important to process 
thought to be retained, and thus eliminates a primary objection to Hua- 
yen causality, unless the doctrine of self-determination has to be re­
tained for its own sake.
This rather generalized discussion of Hua-yen and process thought has 
sought to accomplish several tasks. I have tried, on a modest scale, to 
survey some recent literature which discusses and compares the two 
systems. I have also tried to highlight some of the important criticisms 
of Hua-yen by scholars who are based in or sympathetic to Whitehead’s 
admittedly impressive metaphysics. My main objective has been to try 
to remove some of the points of disagreement by suggesting that Hua- 
yen incorporates a view of causality very close to Whitehead’s, though 
on a more generalized level of description. Primarily, however, I have 
tried to argue that although Whitehead’s view of causality may indeed 
be a true description of what occurs on a microcosmic scale, it is not 
necessarily applicable to the level of everyday social reality. Thus, it may 
be inappropriate to compare the two systems as if they were totally com­
parable systems. Finally, I believe that the detailed description of the 
nature and structure of causality in Whitehead’s thought can serve as 
a hermeneutical device for understanding Buddhist teachings concern­
ing temporal causation, such as karma and karma-result, for instance. 
However, the ideal would be a well-worked-out metaphysics which in­
corporates a reformed Whiteheadianism, in which ideas such as self­
causation and eternal objects were eliminated, and a revised Hua-yen 
causality which eliminates the doctrine of the interpenetration and in­
terdependence of the nine or ten time periods, thus providing for a rea­
soned, coherent, adequate description of both genetic and social reali­
ty. From a Hua-yen perspective, process thought would gain in 
eliminating a tendency to over-substantialize its actual occasions, rejec­
ting an implausible and needless doctrine of self-determination, and fin­
ding a basis for a stronger ethic of compassion and love than it now 
possesses.
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